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COMMENTS
Unless a confidential relationship exists there can not be a
trade secret, although the information is the proper subject mat-
ter upon which to base injunctive relief.15 Thus, if the informa-
tion were obtained by legitimate methods, such as an examination
of the plaintiff's marketed products, no protection would be given
the trade secret.
It is clear that the information misused by the defendant in
the principal case was obtained through a confidential relation-
ship. Therefore, the four step approach used by this court is
adequate to arrive at the correct result ;16 but it is a more indirect
route than that advocated by Holmes, which penetrates immedi-
ately to the question of whether there has been a breach of a
confidential relationship.
It is submitted that a better approach would be: 1) Did the
defendant occupy a position of trust or confidence to the plaintiff,
2) which was breached by the defendant, 3) to obtain informa-
tion of a business or commercial nature, 4) which was used by
the defendant to the detriment of the plaintiff? This approach
would emphasize the breach of the confidential relationship,
rather than the "existence of a trade secret."
WILLS-DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION
La Croix v. Senecal, 99 A.2d 115 (Conn. 1953).
Testatrix died leaving a will and codicil. Although the codicil
expressly revoked the residuary clause of the will, and substituted
a new residuary clause, the only change made by the codicil was
to eliminate the possibility of any uncertainty as to the identity
342, 217 N.W. 339 (1928); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co.,
72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 Atl. 339 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907); Tabor v. Hoffman,
118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889) ; Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Co., 69 Misc. 90, 124 N.Y. Supp. 956 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Pressed Steel
Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 Atl. 4 (1904); RESTATF-
MENT, TORTS § 757," comment b (1939). But cf. Bristol v. Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892).
15. Stewart v. Hock, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903) ; Chadwick v. Covell,
151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1068 (1890); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23
N.E. 12 (1889); See Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co.,
172 F.2d 150 (1949).
16. The second and fourth steps used in the approach to the problem by
the court in the principal case, that the subject matter was communicated
to the defendant and that such information was used by the defendant to
the detriment of the plaintiff, do not provide any difficult questions of law
in this case.
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of one of the legatees. One of the subscribing witnesses to the
codicil was the husband of a residuary legatee. The gift in the
codicil to the wife of the witness, but not the codicil itself, was
invalid under the applicable statute. But the trial court held,
however, that the gift to the wife of the witness was valid under
the will. The appellate court affirmed and held that the testatrix's.
intention to revoke the residuary clause of the will was condi-
tional upon the efficacy of the codicil, and that, because the gift
in the codicil was invalidated by statute, the gift in the will was
not revoked."
Generally the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is ap-
plied when the testator cancels or destroys a duly executed will
with the present intention of making a new disposition of his.
property; the cancellation is considered dependent on, and rela-
tive to, the validity of the new dispositive act, and if the new act
is invalid, the old will is given effect.2 The rule is one of presumed
intention rather than substantive law,3 and seeks to avoid in-
testacy where the acts of cancellation appear conditional and
equivocal. The rule, however, does not create a conclusive pre-
sumption. It can be rebutted or substantiated by extrinsic evi-
dence pertaining to declarations and conduct of the testator.4
The doctrine was limited originally to cases in which the tes-
tator canceled or destroyed a will by physical acts.5 Such acts
were considered equivocal and deserving of explanation. Subse-
quently it was recognized that there was little difference in
principle between a revocation by physical acts and a revocation
effected by the execution of a later instrument. The doctrine has
been expanded to encompass both situationsA
1. La Croix v. Senecal, 99 A.2d 115 (Conn. 1953). The Statute involved'
is CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6952 (1949): "Every devise or bequest given in any
will or codicil to a subscribing witness, shall be void.., but the competency
of such witness shall not be affected by any devise or bequest."
2. 1 PAGE, WILLS § 478 (3d Lifetime ed. 1941).
3. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S.E. 501 (1904); Wallingbad v.
Wallingbad, 266 Ky. 723, 99 S.W.2d 729 (1936); Thomas v. Thomas, 76
Minn. 237, 79 N.W. 104 (1899). Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33
HARv. L. REV. 335, 339-341 (1920).
4. In re Sheaffer's Estate, 240 Pa. 83, 87 At. 577 (1913). See In re Kauf-
man's Estate, 25 Cal.2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945); Flanders v. White, 142
Ore. 375, 18 P.2d 823 (1933). ATKINSON, WILLS § 386 (1937).
5. Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1920);
PoWELL, DEVISES 637 (1st Am. ed. 1807).
6. See Blackford v. Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138, 1157, 286 N.W. 735, 746.
(1939). 1 PAGE, WILLS §§ 479,480 (3d Lifetime ed. 1941).
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The doctrine has been applied to validate wills: where the tes-
tator obliterated parts of the will and interlined certain clauses,
and the interlineation failed for want of due authentication ;7
where the testatrix revoked her will in the mistaken belief that
she had a superseding one ;8 and where a testator had executed
a codicil inconsistent with the original will, but containing no
revocatory language and devising the property to substantially
the same persons, and the codicil was void under the rule against
perpetuities9 At least two courts have limited the doctrine to
cases where an attempted new disposition took place at the same
time as the acts of cancellation, and refused to apply it to cases
where the testator had only a present intention to make a new
disposition unaccompanied by any overt act.10 These courts may
have felt that the application of the doctrine to cases where the
testator did not attempt a new disposition would lend itself to
abuse.
Most courts have not applied dependent relative revocation
where a subsequent instrument is duly executed and contains a
revocatory clause although its dispositive provisions may fail for
causes outside of the instrument." This rule giving effect to the
revocatory clause notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of the dis-
positive provisions has been applied to cases where the subse-
quent instrument has been substantially the same as the original
document,12 as well as where they were totally inconsistent. 3 A
strong minority of courts, however, apparently feeling that the
majority rule defeats rather than effects the intent of the tes-
7. Casey v. Hogan, 344 Ill. 208, 176 N.E. 257 (1931); Walter v. Walter,
301 Mass. 289, 17 N.E.2d 199 (1938) ; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 65 N.H. 230, 19
Atl. 651 (1890).
8. Strong's Appeal, 79 Conn. 123, 63 Atl. 1089 (1906).
9. Altrock v. Vandenburgh, 25 N.Y. Supp. 851 (Sup. Ct. 1893). The
court said that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation would apply
since the codicil did not expressly revoke the will, but if it had, the revoca-
tion would be valid and the doctrine would be inapplicable.
10. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S.E. 501, (1904) ; In re Hough-
ten's Estate, 310 Mich. 613, 17 N.W.2d 774 (1945); In re Bonkowski's Es-
tate, 266 Mich. 112, 253 N.W. 235 (1934).
11. In re Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679 (1914); Price v.
Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857) ; see Ely v. Megie, 219 N.Y. 112, 139, 113 N.E.
800, 807 (1916). 1 PAGE, WILLS § 481 (3d Lifetime ed. 1941).
12. Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N.E. 45 (1888); In re Melville's Es-
tate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679 (1914) ; Teacle's Estate, 153 Pa. 219, 25 Atl.
1135 (1893); Ifutheran Congregation's Appeal, 113 Pa. 32, 5 Atl. 752
(1886); Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857).
13. Wallingford's Executor's v. Wallingford's Administrator's, 226 Ky.
723, 99 S.W.2d 729 (1936).
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tato#, have applied dependent relative revocation in this situation
and have held that the revocatory clause will be treated as con-
ditional upon the validity of its dispositive provisions if the
devises under the second instrument are substantially the same
as the first.1 4 This is the view of the more recent cases.25
The trend appears to be to limit the doctrine's application to
cases where the act of cancellation and the execution of the new
provisions take place simultaneously. But once this requirement
is met, the tendency is to apply the doctrine with great flexibility
to any equivocal revocation where the intent of the testator mani-
fests a preference for the old will to intestacy. The principal case
is exemplary of these trends. The act of revocation was simul-
taneous with the execution of the codicil. The codicil was validly
executed and contained a revocatory clause, but the devise in the
codicil was ineffective. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Eirors
applied to the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in order
to effect the obvious intention of the testatrix, and thus vitiated
the effect of the Connecticut statute which would have caused
that portion of the estate intended for the legatee to descend by
the state laws of intestate succession.
14. Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d 357(D.C. Cir. 1950); In e Thompson's Estate, 185 Cal. 763, 198 Pac. 795(1921); In re Kaufman's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945); Se-
curity Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 Atl. 153 (1898).
15. Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, supra note 14;
In re Kaufman's Estate, supra note 14.
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